In this paper we empirically investigate bidders' performance managed by overconfident and nonoverconfident managers in high and low valuation periods. Using a sample of UK acquisitions in the period 1990-2005, we provide evidence that the interaction between market valuation and different behavioral traits of managers is a key determinant of bidders' announcement returns. In particular, we provide evidence that, in contrast to overconfident managers, non-overconfident managers conduct value-creative acquisition deals in all valuation periods. In addition, when we control for acquirer and deal characteristics, we find that bidders with non-overconfident managers gain the most in high valuation periods, while firms are better off without overconfident managers in any type of market conditions.
INTRODUCTION
A large body of literature has revealed that behavioral elements are important driving forces of acquiring firms' performance in mergers and acquisitions. Shleifer and Vishny's (2003) market valuation theory suggests an irrational investor-rational manager framework where managers are rational, time the market and exploit opportunities that may arise when stock market is in unreasonable highs in the benefit of their shareholders. Further, there has been evidence that more acquisitions take place when stock markets are booming than when they are depressed (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan, 2005) . Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) also argue that acquisitions in high valuation periods, i.e. periods of booming stock markets, are fundamentally different from those in low valuation periods, i.e. periods of depressing stock markets. On the other hand, Roll's (1986) hubris theory posits a rational investor-irrational manager approach where financial markets are efficient and managers engage in acquisitions with an overly optimistic opinion of their ability to create value and potential synergies in a proposed takeover. As a result, they overbid for target firms harmfully to their own shareholders. More recently, Malmendier and Tate (2008) documented that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in acquisitions and obtain worse performance than non-overconfident managers.
Finally, Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007, p. 48) argued that "the irrational manager and irrational investor stories can certainly coexist". Our paper attempts to reconcile these two stories, providing evidence about the role of managerial overconfidence in high and low market valuation periods and the effect to bidders' shareholders wealth.
Unlike investor overconfidence which has been significantly analyzed in the asset pricing literature, the effect of managerial overconfidence on shareholders' wealth has concentrated the attention of very few studies and in the vast majority in the US (Hayward and Hambrick, (1997) , Heaton, (2002) and Malmendier and Tate, (2008) ). The empirical evidence suggests that managers infected by hubris are more likely to destroy shareholders' value. Billett and Qian (2008) , among others, posit that overconfident acquirers (managers) tend to attribute their initial success from previous corporate actions to their own ability and as a consequence conduct worst later deals which underperform significantly those initiated by 'rational' acquirers at the merger announcement. However, how the effect of managerial overconfidence varies with the stock market conditions remains an open question.
Periods of high stock prices can affect the types of acquisitions firms conduct.
Managers may be infected with the same optimism as investors during hot markets. If this is the case, then they might overestimate the synergies from a merger, leading them to make worse acquisitions during hot markets. Alternatively, managers may make acquisitions in high valuation periods because they know their stock price is overvalued. Once the acquisition is announced, investors realize that the stock price of the bidding company is too high, and unload the stock (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) . On the other hand, when stock markets are declining and overconfident bidders still conduct merger deals, investors are much more cautious about the quality of the deal and therefore they are likely to react unfavourably depreciating bidders' stock price.
Following Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) , aggregate stock market activity is classified into high-, neutral-or low-valuation periods based on the P/E ratio of the value-weighted market index. Since we are interested in examining overall market valuations, we use the market index P/E ratio as a proxy for market valuations just like a firm's P/E ratio is used by investors to measure a firm's over-or under-valuation. Quantifying managerial overconfidence is challenging as there is no instrument to directly measure a personality trait.
In this paper, we follow Malmendier and Tate (2008) and use a measure of managerial overconfidence based on stock options, which relies on the propensity of managers of the acquiring firm to hold in-the-money stock options; that is, the timing of option exercises is used to identify managerial overconfidence.
We use a sample of 848 UK mergers and acquisitions between 1990 and 2005 to examine the interaction between market valuations and managerial overconfidence. The country choice was dictated by the fact that U.K. has the most active merger activity after the U.S. and represents more than 65% of merger transactions in Europe. Our short-term results provide evidence of interaction between managerial and aggregate market valuations in shaping acquirers' returns. More specifically, the difference in acquisition performance between the portfolios of acquisitions by non-overconfident managers in high valuation periods and overconfident managers in low valuation periods is a significant 3.05% over the five-day period surrounding the announcement. In addition, bidders with nonoverconfident managers appear to gain the most in high valuation periods, while firms are better off without overconfident managers in all types of market conditions. Our results are robust to a multivariate analysis that controls for factors known to affect acquiring firms' returns, like the method of payment, the listing status of the target firm, and the size and book-to-market ratio of the acquiring firms.
The study has several contributions. First, it provides evidence that the interrelation of market valuation periods and managers with different traits of behaviour is important factor in shaping acquiring firm's returns. Second, in contrast to overconfident managers, our results indicate that non-overconfident managers are able to create value to their shareholders through acquisitions in all market valuation periods. Third, it is reported that bidders have on average worse performance when managed by managers with overconfidence traits in all market conditions. Fourth, it provides evidence that the effect of managerial overconfidence is robust outside the US and not sensitive to the quantitative measure of overconfidence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature of market valuation and managerial overconfidence theories and sets the hypotheses. Section 3 analyzes the classification of market valuation periods and measures of overconfidence.
Section 4 describes the data and the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents and interprets the empirical results. Section 6 presents the robustness check for using a different measure of managerial overconfidence. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that when stocks are overvalued due to investors' optimism managers are likely to announce acquisitions -especially share deals. The managers are prompted to use their overvalued stocks to acquire valuable economic entities through M&A and hence more acquisitions should take place during stock market booms. Target managers with short horizon would accept the bidding firm's overvalued equity and seek to secure their gains before the value of equity reverts to its fundamental value. In other words, both bidding and target firm's managers attempt to time the market for their own interests.
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT (i) Stock Market Valuation
Rhodes- Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) theorise that although target managers are rational they lack perfect information and overestimate the potential synergies of the deal.
Consequently they accept offers from overvalued bidders during bullish markets. RhodesKropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) empirically show that M&A activities peak when market valuations are high. During the period of high market valuation caused by investor's optimism, the market reaction to a bid announcement should be more favorable than to bids announced at other times (Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) 
(ii) Managerial Overconfidence
Managerial overconfidence is defined as overestimation of CEO's own abilities and outcomes relating to actions which are under their control (Langer, 1975) . The theoretical foundations of overconfidence theory are based upon an extensive literature in psychology which finds that people are generally overconfident (Frank, 1935; Weinstein, 1980) . People tend to overestimate their abilities relative to the average when assessing their relative skills (Larwood and Whittaker, 1977) and underestimate the odds of downside potential. In the same rationale self-attribution is introduced in the literature as a root of overconfidence, which assumes the 'better than average effect' (Svenson, 1981) and 'narrow confidence intervals' implying that people are miscalibrated in the way that their probability distributions or confidence intervals for uncertain events (i.e., outcome of an action) are too tight (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982) . Roll (1986) was the first to study the behavioral element of overconfidence in an M&A context. In this framework overconfidence is displayed in two forms: first, a corporate manager may overestimate the synergy gains of the potential merger. This overvaluation stems from the manager's belief that his leadership skills are better than average or from the underestimation of the downside of the merger due to the illusion of control over its outcome (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) . That is, overconfident managers feel that they have the ability to identify hidden synergies and pick promising targets that others cannot. They overestimate the future returns from 'hand-picked' investment projects or the capitalized value of their future leadership.
1 Consistent with Billett and Qian (2008) On the other hand, when overconfident bidders conduct deals in depressing markets, there is no "cover" to hide the quality of the deal and the possible overpayment. Investors in low valuation markets are substantially more careful in assessing the future prospects of the deal and therefore are likely to react even more unfavourably when realizing that the deal is bad, depreciating bidder's stock price. Given the above, we should expect that bidders should gain (lose) the most when they are run by non-overconfident (overconfident) managers and the deal takes place in boom (bear) markets.
CLASSIFICATION OF MARKET VALUATION PERIODS AND MEASURE OF MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE (i) Classification of market valuation periods
We follow Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) and classify each calendar month into high-, neutral-, or low-valuation month based on the detrended market price to earnings (P/E) ratio of a broad based value-weighted market index (TOTMKUK). The market P/E ratio is detrended by removing the best straight line fit (OLS) from the P/E ratio of the month in question and the five preceding years. 2 Months are then classified into an above (below) average group if its detrended index P/E ratio is above (below) the past five-year average, and subsequently ranked in descending order of detrended P/E ratios. Months that belong to the top half of the above average group are classified as high-valuation periods, and those that belong to the bottom half of the below average group are classified as lowvaluation periods. All remaining months are categorized as neutral-valuation periods. This results in 56 high-valuation, 40 low-valuation and 96 neutral-valuation months.
(ii) Measure of Managerial Overconfidence
To capture overconfidence, we classify managers as overconfident or nonoverconfident based on managers' decisions concerning their executive stock options (Malmendier and Tate (2008) ). CEOs normally receive huge grants of stock and non-tradable options as part of their compensation plan. Carpenter (1998) and Hall and Murphy (2002) ,
argue that risk averse CEOs should exercise their stock options before expiration if they are sufficient in the money since they are exposed to enormous firm-specific risk which cannot be diversified away. Upon exercise, the managers receive shares of company stock which are almost always immediately sold (Ofek and Yermack (2000) ). According to Malmendier and Tate (2008) , CEOs are classified as overconfident when they maintain their stock options until the expiration date and are exposed to high levels of risk under the belief that their company's stock will perform continuously better as an outcome of their leadership.
We firstly identify the CEOs of our sample firms around the announcement date.
4
After creating a name list of the CEOs, we search for the date the stock option was granted to the managers, the date that they can start exercising the option, the expiration date of the option and the strike price. In most cases, executive options in the U.K. have a life span of ten years with a vesting period of three years (i.e. they are exercisable three years after the period they were granted). Following Malmendier and Tate (2008) , if managers hold the option until the last year before the expiration date, they are classified as overconfident.  The acquirer is a U.K. firm publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and has five days of return data around the acquisition announcement date.
 The target company is either listed or unlisted company and domestic or foreign firm.
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 The acquirer owns less than 10% of the target company's stock before the bid announcement and more than 50% after the deal.
 The deal value is ₤1 million or more.
 The deal value represents at least 1% of the market value of the acquirer.
In addition to these criteria, we require that stock options data for bidding firms' Looking at the Table 1 we observe an increased merger activity in the late 1990s, when the market was in a booming period, consistent with the literature which provides evidence of high correlation between merger activity and market valuation (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001 ).
[Insert Table 1 About Here] versus non-overconfident). The acquirer's market capitalization equals the price per share one-month prior to the bid announcement times the number of common shares outstanding. The target's firm size is measured as the deal value of the bid at the announcement. For the entire sample, the mean (median) size of the acquirer is 638.33 million pounds (154.29 million pounds) for 303 unique acquirers, while for targets the mean (median) size, measured as transaction value, is 59.237 million pounds (8 million pounds).
An interesting observation that emerges from the sample is that private firms comprise the vast majority of targets (722 or 85%) in contrast to the small number of publicly traded targets (126 or 15%). 8 The mean value of acquirers in public acquisition is by far larger than the mean value of bidders in private acquisitions (slightly less than five times the market capitalization). In deal value terms, public targets exhibit a disproportional percentage of total deal value (68%) when considering their small contribution to the total number of acquisitions (15%). In fact, public firms are by far larger than private firms (the average transaction value of public firms equals to ₤274 million versus ₤21 million for private firms).
Looking at the summary statistics by market valuation periods, 248 acquisitions announced during high-valuation periods, 400 during neutral-valuation periods and 200 during low-valuation periods. Thus, consistent with previous literature, we have more deals in booming markets (29.35%) than in low-valuation periods (23.58%). 9 With respect to the deal value, despite the inflated deal values, the percentage of total deal value in high valuation months (26.35%) is only slightly higher than that in low valuation months (23.05%).
[Insert Table 2 About Here]
(ii) Methodology
To examine acquiring firms' performance we employ a standard event study and calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the five-day period (-2, +2) around the announcement date. Since many acquiring firms in our sample engage in frequent acquisitions within 200 days, previous acquisition announcement returns will be included in the estimation period if we use the standard market model approach, contaminating market parameter estimations. Thus, following Fuller et al. (2002), we estimate the abnormal returns using a modified market model:
Where AR i,t is the excess return of bidder i on day t; R it is the return of bidder i on day t; R mt is the value-weighted market index return. Table 3 , Panel A, reports the announcement returns (5-day CARs) for the full sample and for sub-samples based on market valuation periods (high, neutral, low). The empirical evidence reveals that on average acquirer's shareholders gain a significantly positive return 10 However, we do also calculate CARs following Brown and Warner's (1985) standard event study methodology which yields qualitatively similar results that we do not report for brevity.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS (i) Announcement returns of Acquirers
(0.94%) at the bid announcement. The market valuation theory suggests that high-valuation acquirers outperform low-valuation acquirers in the short-run. Consistent with Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) , the market reaction to acquisition deals undertaken during bullish periods is significantly positive (1.21%) and outperforms low-valuation deals (0.34%) by an economically (but not statistically) significant margin (0.87%).
Panel B of Table 3 compares the abnormal returns earned by overconfident bidders to the returns generated by non-overconfident bidders. The overconfidence bias suggests that managerial overconfidence should be associated with lower wealth effects than those generated by non-overconfident acquirers. Table 3 confirms that the market reaction to acquisition deals made by overconfident and non-overconfident managers is considerably different. For non-overconfident acquirers the mean acquirer abnormal return is 1.26%, significantly different from zero. For overconfident acquirers we find that the mean acquirer abnormal return over the five-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement date is 0.16% and statistically insignificant. The mean difference in abnormal returns between non-overconfident and overconfident is 1.10% and statistically significant at the 5% level.
This suggests that overconfident acquirers fail to outperform non-overconfident acquirers.
This evidence supports the theoretical prediction of Malmendier and Tate (2008) It is also important to notice that the performance of non-overconfident acquirers is not sensitive to the overall stock market conditions. The return difference between the performance in high valuation periods and the performance in low valuation periods is a negligible 24 basis points. The acquisition performance of overconfident managers seems to be correlated with the stock market cycle. In fact, the difference between high and low periods is a statistically significant 2.51% over the 5-day period surrounding the announcement. When we compare acquisition performance of the two extreme portfolios, i.e., non-overconfident managers in high-valuation periods and overconfident managers in low-valuation periods, we interestingly obtain a significant return differential of 3.05%. This result shows that the interaction of overconfidence biases by managers and overall stock market valuation is an important driver of acquiring firm's announcement returns.
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
ii) Multivariate Analysis
The M&A literature has documented a number of different factors that affect the performance of bidding firms surrounding the event, such as book-to-market (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) , size (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004) relative size (Fuller et al., (2002) and industry diversification (Doukas and Kan, 2004) .
The results generated so far by employing a univariate type of analysis signify that overconfident bidders realize considerably lower announcement returns than nonoverconfident acquirers, especially during low stock market valuation period. To better examine whether differences in acquirer and deal characteristics explain the abnormal return differentials we adopt a multivariate regression framework where announcement period returns to bidders are regressed against a set of explanatory variables that have been proved in the literature to affect bidders' performance.
In all regressions we include the following control variables: a dummy that takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; a dummy that takes the value of one if the acquisition is stock-(cash-) financed and zero otherwise. To control for the bidder's size effect, we introduce the log of the bidder's stock market capitalization a month before the deal's announcement. Other variables included in the regression are the following: the bidder's book-to-market value, which is measured by the bidder's net book value of assets divided by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; the deal's relative size, which is measured as the ratio of the deal value over the bidder's value; a dummy variable for diversifying deals which takes the value of 1 when the acquirer's two- In the next regression (2), we regress the acquisition CARs on the dummy for overconfident managers and the set of control variables. As expected from the univariate analysis, the coefficient is negative and significant, documenting that overconfident managers do worse acquisitions than non-overconfident ones. For the control variables, results are similar to regression (1) with the exception of the positive coefficient for the private acquisitions dummy, which turns to be significant.
Finally in regressions (3) and (4), we include interaction variables between overconfidence and stock market valuation. In regression (3), the vector of explanatory variables includes dummy variables to capture for bids announced by bidders with non-overconfident (overconfident) managers at the time of high (low) market valuation to allow for interaction between managerial overconfidence and aggregate market performance.
The dummy for high valuation/non-overconfident managers is positive and significant, which indicates that non-overconfident managers are able to exploit favorable market conditions to close out deals that, at least in the short-term, improve the firm's stock price.
On the other hand, the dummy variable for deals made by overconfident managers in low acquisition periods does not have a negative relationship with the announcement returns in regressions (3) and (4) [Insert Table 4 About Here]
iii) Private Acquisitions
We have mentioned earlier that our sample is mainly composed of acquisitions of nonpublicly listed firms (approximately 85% of the total sample).
In this section, we analyze separately the sample of private acquisitions to investigate whether our results are robust to the listing status of the target company. The difference (0.82%) is statistically significant at 1% level.
Panel B examines acquisition performance of firms with overconfident managers and non-overconfident managers. Consistent to the full sample results, overconfident managers exhibit inferior performance (0.72%) relative to to their less overconfident counterparts (1.61%). The difference is statistically significant.
Panel C also confirms the interaction results presented in Table 3 . While overconfidence does not have a significant impact in high-and neutral-valuation periods, in low-valuation periods, overconfident managers do not obtain the same performance as non-overconfident managers. In particular, non-overconfident managers enjoy a profit of 11 The limited competition hypothesis suggests that the bidding competition among private targets is likely to be less intense and the higher likelihood of underpayment can lead to larger returns for the bidder (Chang (1998) ). 12 The monitoring hypothesis implies that through stock offers the small number of owners of the private firm will become blockholders of the new combined firm. The effect is close monitoring of the managerial performance by this group of stockholders leading to an increase in firm value (Draper and Paudyal (2006) , Chang (1998) ). 13 According to the information hypothesis, the owners of the private firms have high incentives to assess properly the value of the stock of the bidding firm since they will end up having large amounts of shares in a stock offer. This fact conveys favourable news to the market and a rise in the stock price of the bidders surrounding the announcement date (Chang (1998) , Draper and Paudyal (2006)) 1.41% over the 5-day event period, while overconfident bidders generate an insignificant -0.78% over the same period. Their mean difference equals to 2.19% and is statistically significant.
Panel D presents the multivariate regression analysis for the private firms' subsample.
Results are remarkably similar to those presented in Table 4 in the first two regressions.
Managerial overconfidence remains negatively related to the short-run performance of bidders acquiring a private company, even after we control for factors known to affect acquisition returns (regression 2). However, regressions (3) and (4) confirm the event studies' tests that overconfidence leads to worse acquisitions in low valuation periods when we restrict the sample to acquisitions of private companies. More specifically, the low valuation-overconfident variable carries a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level, which signifies that is in period of depressed stock market prices that managerial overconfidence is more detrimental to firm's shareholders.
In unreported analysis, we repeat the analysis for acquisition of public firms, for which we have a rather limited sample (122 observations). Acquirers of listed targets suffer a loss (-1.51%) in line with previous evidence (Andrade et al., 2001 in the US, and Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) and Higson and Elliott (1998) in the UK). The abnormal returns are worse in low market valuation periods (-3.02%) than in high market valuation periods (-0.97%). However, the economically large difference (2.05%) is not statistically significant, probably because of the limited size of the sample. The market reaction to the announcement of the acquisition of a publicly listed firm is larger when the manager is overconfident, but the difference (1.14%) is not statistically significant. As in the previous subsamples, the worst acquisitions are those made by overconfident managers when the stock market is depressed (-5.40%). However, the very small sample size does not permit to draw meaningful conclusions from a statistical point of view. Finally, in the multivariate analysis for publicly listed firms, the interaction dummies of non-overconfident bidders with high and low valuation periods respectively are both positive and statistically significant.
[Insert Table 5 About Here]
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: MULTIPLE ACQUIRER PROXY
While the overconfidence measure based on stock option is the most commonly accepted proxy of managerial overconfidence, it has a drawback in our sample. In particular, we are not able to classify a large fraction of managers because of data limitations. To address the concern that there is no a sample selection bias, we check for the robustness of our results using another commonly used proxy of managerial overconfident: multiple acquisitions.
Fuller et al. (2002) define multiple acquirers as firms that make five or more
acquisitions within a 3-year period. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) use the same definition to define multiple acquirers and argue that they are infected by overconfidence which is rooted from self-attribution bias and which in turn leads to lower wealth effects than those generated by rational bidders. In this study, we adopt a similar approach with one very important, however, differentiation: to classify firms as multiple or single bidders, we do not refer to companies but to managers themselves. Therefore, managers who perform multiple acquisitions (5 or more) in a small period of time (3 years) are defined as overconfident. Since we focus on managerial overconfidence, it would be more reliable to adopt this proxy from the perspective of the CEO him/herself. A company may have contacted 5 or more acquisitions in a 3-year period of time, but in the meantime different individuals (CEOs) might have taken the decisions for those projects. In total, we obtained data for 3099 deals, 14 a much larger sample to 848 deals with stock options data. We find that 2256 (72%) acquisitions were conducted by non-overconfident managers and 843 (27%) by overconfident managers. Despite being larger, the average deal value in this sample is 66.29 million, remarkably similar to the 59.24 million documented in Table 1 for the stock-options sample. In sum, the summary statistics for overconfident and nonoverconfident bidders are qualitatively similar for both proxies, a fact that enhances the representativeness and robustness of the sub-samples used in the empirical analysis for the 2 different measures of overconfidence.
15 Tables 6 and 7 present the univariate and multivariate results respectively when using the multiple acquirer proxy. The univariate tests in Table 6 confirm the results obtained with stock options proxy that overconfident managers generate significant lower announcement returns (0.88%) than non-overconfident bidders (1.65%). Their mean difference in the event window (-2, +2) is a positive CAR of 0.77% and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Similarly to the stock option based proxy, non-overconfident bidders earn larger returns both in high and low valuation markets, but the difference is statistically significant only in high valuation markets (0.94%). Finally, the mean difference between the two extreme portfolios of deals undertaken by non-overconfident managers in high-valuation markets and those conducted by overconfident managers in low-valuation markets is 1.97% and significant at the 1% level. Finally, Table 7 reports the cross-sectional results, which are akin to those reported in Table 4 for the stock-option sample. This indicates that the relationship between bidder returns and overconfident managers in high and low markets is robust even after using a larger sample and different proxy of managerial overconfidence.
[Insert Tables 6 & 7 About Here]
CONCLUSION
In this study we empirically investigate the interaction between stock market valuation and managerial overconfidence and the effect on bidder returns. In particular, we examine the performance of acquirers in different stock market valuation periods (high neutral and low)
for deals undertaken by overconfident and non-overconfident managers. Our results provide evidence that the interaction between managerial overconfidence and market valuation is an important factor in explaining bidder announcement returns. The main finding indicates that non-overconfident managers are able to enhance shareholders' wealth through value-creative acquisitions in all types of market conditions. After controlling for several deal and acquirer characteristics, we also find that non-overconfident managers realize their largest returns in high valuation periods while firms are better off in all market periods without overconfident managers when engage in merger deals.
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Acquisitions by the Stock Options Proxy for High-and Low-Valuation Periods
The table presents the number of acquisitions, the mean and median market value of acquirers and the mean and median values of targets. The last three columns list the total deal value and the percentage of total value of transaction and number of acquisitions, respectively. The summary statistics are provided on the basis of a sample of 3223 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005 undertaken by 303 unique bidders. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Targets include both domestic and foreign public and private firms. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high-(low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfident and nonoverconfident managers are classified based on a stock option measure: Managers who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as non-overconfident. The acquirer's market capitalization equals the price per share one-month prior to the bid announcement times the number of common shares outstanding. The target's firm size is measured as the deal value of the bid. 
Type of Acquisition

Number of Acquisitions
Mean Market Equity (£ mil)
Median
where R it is the return on firm i at time t and R mt is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In panel A, using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high-(low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. The number of bids for each category is reported below the mean return. In Panel B managers who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as non-overconfident. Panel C reports the CARs for the interaction of market valuation and managerial overconfidence. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by 'a', 'b' and 'c', respectively. The (1)- (3) and (4)- (5) represent the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high-minus low-valuation bidders and non-overconfident minus overconfident bidders respectively. The result in right bottom corner is the mean CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high-non-overconfident bidders minus low-overconfident bidders. P-values are reported in brackets. This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer's five-day cumulative abnormal return (-2, +2) surrounding the announcement controlling for market valuation and managerial overconfidence effects and other deal and acquirer characteristics. The vector of explanatory variables includes dummies representing bids announced by firms with rational (overconfident) managers during high (low) market valuation periods, high-valuation period deals and low-valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high-(low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfidence deals dummy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the manager holds the options until the year before the expiration date and 0 otherwise. Private variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% cash and 0 otherwise. Common-stock deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% stock and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of the market value a month before the deal's announcement. Bidder's book-to-market is measured by the bidder's net book value of assets divided by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal's relative size is the ratio between the deal value and the market value of the bidder firm; a dummy variable for diversifying deals take the value of 1 when the acquirer's two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. Merger activity dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorized as an active period if the number of deals is more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer's lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the bid's announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the announcement. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by 'a', 'b' and 'c', respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Panels A to C present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) surrounding the announcement of private firms' acquisitions by stock market valuation conditions, managerial overconfidence, and their interaction. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model (AR it = R it -R mt ) where R it is the return on firm i at time t and R mt is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In panel A, using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high-(low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. The number of bids for each category is reported below the mean return. In Panel B managers who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as non-overconfident. Panel C reports the CARs for the interaction of market valuation and managerial overconfidence. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by 'a', 'b' and 'c', respectively. The (1)- (3) and (4)- (5) represent the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high-minus low-valuation bidders and non-overconfident minus overconfident bidders respectively. The result in right bottom corner is the mean CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high-non-overconfident bidders minus low-overconfident bidders. P-values are reported in brackets. Panel D presents regression estimates of the acquirer's five-day cumulative abnormal return (-2, +2) surrounding the announcement controlling for market valuation and managerial overconfidence effects and other deal and acquirer characteristics. The vector of explanatory variables includes dummies representing bids announced by firms with rational (overconfident) managers during high (low) market valuation periods, high-valuation period deals and low-valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high-(low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfidence deals dummy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the manager holds the options until the year before the expiration date and 0 otherwise. Cash deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% cash and 0 otherwise. Common-stock deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% stock and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of the market value a month before the deal's announcement. Bidder's book-to-market is measured by the bidder's net book value of assets divided by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal's relative size is the ratio between the deal value and the market value of the bidder firm; a dummy variable for diversifying deals take the value of 1 when the acquirer's two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. Merger activity dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorized as an active period if the number of deals is more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer's lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the bid's announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the announcement. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by 'a', 'b' and 'c', respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Ri-Rm (-180,-3) 0.010 (0.009) 
where R it is the return on firm i at time t and R mt is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In panel A, using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high-(low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. The number of bids for each category is reported below the mean return. In Panel B CEOs that make five or more acquisitions within a 3-year period are classified as overconfident managers. All others are classified as non-overconfident. Panel C reports the CARs for the interaction of market valuation and managerial overconfidence. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by 'a', 'b' and 'c', respectively. The (1)- (3) and (4)- (5) represent the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high-minus low-valuation bidders and non-overconfident minus overconfident bidders respectively. The result in right bottom corner is the mean CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high-non-overconfident bidders minus low-overconfident bidders. P-values are reported in brackets. This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer's five-day cumulative abnormal return (-2, +2) surrounding the announcement controlling for market valuation and managerial overconfidence effects and other deal and acquirer characteristics. The vector of explanatory variables includes dummies representing bids announced by firms with rational (overconfident) managers during high (low) market valuation periods, high-valuation period deals and low-valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high-(low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfidence deals dummy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a manager conducts five or more acquisitions within a 3-year period and 0 otherwise. Private variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% cash and 0 otherwise. Common-stock deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% stock and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of the market value a month before the deal's announcement. Bidder's book-to-market is measured by the bidder's net book value of assets divided by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal's relative size is the ratio between the deal value and the market value of the bidder firm; a dummy variable for diversifying deals take the value of 1 when the acquirer's two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. Merger activity dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorised as an active period if the number of deals is more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer's lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the bid's announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the announcement. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by 'a', 'b' and 'c', respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
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